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Security in Locally Repairable Storage
Abhishek Agarwal and Arya Mazumdar Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper we extend the notion of locally re-
pairable codes to secret sharing schemes. The main problem that
we consider is to find optimal ways to distribute shares of a
secret among a set of storage-nodes (participants) such that the
content of each node (share) can be recovered by using contents
of only few other nodes, and at the same time the secret can
be reconstructed by only some allowable subsets of nodes. As
a special case, an eavesdropper observing some set of specific
nodes (such as less than certain number of nodes) does not get
any information. In other words, we propose to study a locally
repairable distributed storage system that is secure against a
passive eavesdropper that can observe some subsets of nodes.
We provide a number of results related to such systems
including upper-bounds and achievability results on the number
of bits that can be securely stored with these constraints. In
particular, we provide conditions under which a locally repairable
code can be turned into a secret sharing scheme and extend the
results of secure repairable storage to cooperative repair and
storage on networks. Additionally, we consider perfect secret
sharing schemes over general access structures under locality
constraints and give an example of a perfect secret sharing
scheme that can have small locality. Lastly, we provide a lower
bound on the size of a share compared to the size of the secret
that shows how locality affects the sizes of shares in a perfect
scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing schemes were proposed by Shamir and
Blakley [3], [22] to provide security against an eavesdropper
with unbounded computational capability. Consider the secret
as a realization of a (uniform) random vector S over some
support. Define [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} and let 2A denote the
power set for set A. Suppose that shares of the secret are to
be distributed among n participants (storage nodes) such that
a set of shares belonging to As ⊆ 2[n], is able to determine
the secret. As is called the access structure of the secret
sharing scheme. Denote the random variable corresponding
to the share of a participant (or node) i ∈ [n] by Ci and
let C = (C1C2 . . . Cn). Let xA denote the projection of the
vector x ∈ Fn to the co-ordinates in A ⊆ [n]. For a singleton
set A = {i} let xi := x{i}. A secure scheme has the property
that a subset of shares in the block-list Bs ⊆ 2[n] are unable to
determine anything about the secret. Thus, H(S|CB) = H(S)
for any B ∈ Bs and H(S|CA) = 0 for any A ∈ As, where
H(·) denotes the entropy1. For a standard monotone secret
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1The unit of entropy in this paper is q-ary, where q is an integer that will
be clear from context.
sharing scheme the classes As and Bs must have the following
properties,
A′ ⊇ A,A ∈ As =⇒ A
′ ∈ As
B′ ⊆ B,B ∈ Bs =⇒ B
′ ∈ Bs
and
Bs ⊆ 2
[n] \ As.
For a perfect secret sharing scheme we have the above
monotone property and Bs = 2[n] \ As. Perfect schemes for
access structures of the form As = {A ⊆ [n] : |A| ≥ m} are
called threshold secret sharing schemes. We refer to [2] for a
comprehensive survey of secret sharing schemes.
A convenient property of schemes that need to store data
in a distributed storage system is local repairability [8] i.e.
any storage node can be repaired by accessing a small subset
of other nodes, much smaller than is required for decoding
the complete data. Error-correcting codes with the local repair
property – locally repairable codes (LRC) – have been the
center of a lot of research activities lately [4], [8], [16], [24].
Consider an n length code over a q-ary alphabet, C ⊆ Fnq
of size |C| = qk. The code is said to have locality r, if for
every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists a set Ri ⊆ [n] \ {i} with
|Ri| ≤ r such that for any two codewords u,u′ ∈ C satisfying
ui 6= u′i, we have uRi 6= u′Ri . In a code with locality r,
any symbol of a codeword can be deduced by reading only
at most r other symbols of the codeword. For application in
distributed storage, the code is further required to have a large
minimum distance d, since that helps recovery in the event of
a catastrophic failures (i.e., up to d − 1 node failures). It is
known that [8] for such a code,
d ≤ n− k − ⌈k/r⌉+ 2, (1)
which is also achievable [16], [24]. A q-ary code of length n,
size qk and locality r will be called an (n, k, r)q-optimal LRC
if it’s minimum distance satisfies (1) with equality.
Security in distributed storage has recently been considered
in a number of papers, for example [9], [17], [20], [25]
and references therein. In these papers the main objective is
to secure stored or downloaded data against an adversary.
Threshold secret sharing protocols over a network under
some communication constraint has been considered in [21].
Problems most closely related to this paper perhaps appear in
[18] where a version of threshold secret sharing scheme with
locality has been studied. Motivated by the above applications
in distributed storage, we analyze secret sharing schemes with
different access structures such that shares of each partici-
pant/node can be repaired with locality r.
2A. Contributions and organization
Our contributions in this paper are summarized in the
following list.
1) Distributed storage. We provide bounds and achievability
results for a locally repairable scheme for access structure
and block-list, As = {A ⊆ [n] : |A| ≥ m} and
Bs = {B ⊆ [n] : |B| ≤ ℓ}, respectively. As evident
from definition 1, this access and block structures model
a simple distributed storage scenario. We assume that the
shares of the secrets are locally recoverable and at the
same time an adversary observing up to ℓ shares does
not get any information. A more general version of this
model that also considers repair bandwidth as a parameter
appears in [18]. In section II we also address the conditions
under which a locally repairable error-correcting code can
be converted into a secret sharing scheme with the above
access structure.
Comparison of this part with results of [18]: In [18],
bounds on secrecy capacity for regenerating and locally
recoverable codes have been derived using information
theoretic inequalities, and achievability of these bounds
using schemes that require Gabidulin precoding technique
has been shown.
Our method to prove the converse result is different from
that used in [18]. One advantage of our technique for
the bound in section II is that it can be easily applied
to cooperative repair (section III) and repairable codes on
graphs (section IV).
We provide a random coding argument using network flow
graphs to show the existence of an achievability scheme
for the bound, and also adapt the method of [18] for
more general scenarios mentioned above (i.e., cooperative
repair and repairable codes on graphs). For these scenarios,
we use lemma 6 and Gabidulin precoding to construct
transformations to form secure schemes from existing non-
secure locally repairable codes.
2) Maximal recoverability. The Gabidulin precoding described
above can be used to construct optimal codes but requires
an exponentially large (in n) alphabet size. A simple
construction of secret sharing schemes from LRCs is
provided in eq. (14). We specify in lemma 6 the additional
constraints that an optimal LRC would have to satisfy
to be able to construct optimal secret sharing schemes
in this method. This shows that to construct an optimal
secure scheme with small share size we essentially need
a maximally recoverable code over small alphabet (see
theorem 8).
3) Perfect secret sharing with small locality. In section V,
we consider perfect secret sharing schemes over general
access structures under locality constraints. While we show
that for threshold secret sharing schemes, there cannot exist
any non-trivial local repairability, we give an example of a
perfect secret sharing scheme that can have small locality.
4) Lower bound on the size of shares in terms of the size of
the secret. Furthering the result of [5] to locally repairable
schemes we provide an analogous lower-bound on the size
of a share compared to the size of the secret. We further
show how locality effects the sizes of shares in a perfect
scheme as they relate to the size of the secret. These results
are presented in section V (see theorem 14).
5) Extension. We extend the notion of security to cooperative
local repair [19] where a Distributed Storage System can
deal with simultaneous multiple node failures. We provide
upper-bounds on the secrecy capacity and construct achiev-
able schemes for this scenario in section III.
6) Extension. A different and practical generalization for
secret sharing scheme is made in which the Distributed
Storage System is represented by a graph G such that a
node can only connect to its neighbors in G for repair.
This scenario has been considered in section IV.
II. A SECRET-SHARING SCHEME FOR DISTRIBUTED
STORAGE
We start this section by formally defining a secret sharing
scheme for a particular, common access structure and block-
list: As = {A ⊆ [n] : |A| ≥ m} and Bs = {B ⊆ [n] : |B| ≤
ℓ}. For a code C ⊂ Fnq and set I ⊂ [n] define CI := {xI ∈
F
|I|
q : x ∈ C}.
Definition 1. An (n, k, ℓ,m, r)q-secret sharing scheme con-
sists of a randomized encoder f that maps a uniform secret
S ∈ Fkq randomly to C = f(S) ∈ Fnq , and must have the
following three properties.
1) (Recovery) Given any m symbols of C , the secret S is
completely determined. This guarantees that the secret is
recoverable even with the loss of any n−m shares.
H(S|CI) = 0, ∀I ⊆ [n], |I| = m (2)
2) (Security) Any set of ℓ shares of C does not reveal
anything about the secret.
H(S|CJ) = H(S), ∀J ⊆ [n], |J | = ℓ (3)
A scheme satisfying this condition is called ℓ-secure. An
eavesdropper that can observe ℓ nodes is called an ℓ-
strength eavesdropper.
3) (Locality) For any share, there exist at most r other shares
that completely determine this. For all i, there exists Ri ⊆
[n] \ {i} : |Ri| ≤ r, such that
H(Ci|CRi) = 0 (4)
Ri is called the recovery set of share i.
The maximum amount of secret that can be stored as
a function of n, ℓ,m and r is called the capacity of the
secret sharing scheme and in the following we provide exact
characterization of this quantity. We can define the security
condition above in a modified way where the eavesdropper is
allowed to see any set J ⊆ [n] of shares and we calculate
the amount of information revealed, i.e. I(S;CJ ), in terms
of n, k, |J |,m and r in an optimal scheme. This extension is
easy from our result and somewhat summarized in corollary 4.
Note that, for locally repairable schemes with no security
requirement i.e. ℓ = 0 the following lower-bound on m is
apparent from (1),
m ≥ k + ⌈k/r⌉ − 1, (5)
3This lower bound follows from the definition of the minimum
distance of a code d = n−m+1. In the subsequent, we provide
the fundamental limit on secrecy capacity and constructions
achieving that limit.
As mentioned in the introduction, a generalized version
of this type of secret-sharing scheme that include repair-
bandwidth and other parameters was studied in [18]. Our
theorems 2 and 5 can be obtained as a consequence of
results of that paper. We still provide different proofs of these
results as the concepts introduced will be useful for later
developments.
A. Bounds
Let us first prove an immediate and naive upper bound on
the capacity of a locally repairable secret sharing scheme that
follows as a consequence of Eq. (5).
Proposition 1. For any (n, k, ℓ,m, r)q-secret sharing scheme,
k ≤ m− ℓ−
⌊
m− ℓ
r + 1
⌋
Proof: Consider the randomized encoding f of any
(n, k, ℓ,m, r)-secret sharing scheme. For any secret s ∈ Fkq ,
define the support of the map f(s) to be supp(f(s)) = {x ∈
Fnq : Pr(f(s) = x) 6= 0}. Clearly for any pair s, s′ ∈ Fkq
s 6= s′, supp(f(s)) ∩ supp(f(s′)) = ∅.
Suppose, for some s ∈ Fkq , x ∈ supp(f(s)). Let I ⊆ [n]
and |I| = ℓ. Note that, for each s′ ∈ Fkq \ s, there must
exist z ∈ supp(f(s′)) such that zI = xI (from the Security
property). Let C ⊆ {z ∈ supp(f(s′)) : s′ ∈ Fkq and zI = xI}
such that |C ∩ supp(f(s′))| = 1∀s′ ∈ Fkq . We have C ⊆ Fnq
and |C| = qk. Moreover, from the Recovery property, any m
coordinates of a vector in C must be unique, which implies C
has minimum distance at least n−m+ 1.
Since {f(s) : s ∈ Fkq} has locality r any set C ⊂ {f(s) :
s ∈ Fkq} must have locality r. Since, all the codewords in C
have fixed value on the co-ordinates I , C[n]\I ∈ Fn−ℓq must
be a code of length n− ℓ and locality r. Moreover, C[n]\I has
minimum distance at least n−m+1 (same as C). Now from
eq. (1) we have,
n−m+ 1 ≤ (n− ℓ)− k − ⌈k/r⌉+ 2
⇐⇒ k + ⌈k/r⌉ − 1 ≤ m− ℓ (6a)
⇐⇒ k ≤ m− ℓ −
⌊
m− ℓ
r + 1
⌋
(6b)
where eq. (6b) follows by replacing both sides of eq. (6a) by
Incr0(k + ⌈k/r⌉ − 1) and Incr0(m− ℓ) respectively, where
Incr0(.) denotes the increasing function Incr0(x) := x −⌊
x
r+1
⌋
.
This naive bound in eq. (6a) is not the best possible: it can
be further improved to
k + ℓ+
⌈
k + ℓ
r
⌉
− 1 ≤ m. (7)
To prove (7), instead of trying to use eq. (1) as a black-box,
we follow its proof method [4], [8].
Theorem 2. Any (n, k, ℓ,m, r)q-secret sharing scheme must
satisfy,
k + ℓ ≤ m−
⌊
m
r + 1
⌋
. (8)
The upper-bound in eq. (8) can also be obtained from [18,
Theorem 33] where the authors use a different method. It
should be noted that eq. (8) is equivalent to eq. (7). We see
that eq. (7) =⇒ eq. (8) by replacing both sides in eq. (8) by
the increasing function Incr0(x) := x−⌊x/(r+1)⌋. Similarly
eq. (8) =⇒ eq. (7) by replacing each side with the increasing
function Incr1(x) := x+ ⌈x/r⌉ − 1. This follows because of
the following fact,
Claim 3. For x, y, r ∈ Z+,
y = x+
⌈x
r
⌉
− 1 ⇐⇒ x = y −
⌊
y
r + 1
⌋
(9)
Proof: Let x = qr + w, w < r. Then, we have.
x+
⌈x
r
⌉
− 1−
⌊
x+
⌈
x
r
⌉
− 1
r + 1
⌋
(10a)
= x+ q +
⌈w
r
⌉
− 1−
⌊
qr + w + q +
⌈
w
r
⌉
− 1
r + 1
⌋
(10b)
= x+
⌈w
r
⌉
−
⌊
w +
⌈
w
r
⌉
− 1
r + 1
⌋
− 1 (10c)
= x (10d)
where eq. (10d) follows since ⌈wr ⌉−
⌊
w+⌈wr ⌉−1
r+1
⌋
−1 = 0 for
w ∈ [0, r− 1]. Now, substituting y = x+
⌈
x
r
⌉
− 1 in eq. (10a)
we have, eq. (9).
Proof of theorem 2: Let Λi = {Ri∪{i}}. Recall that we
can recover the secret S from any m symbols in the n length
word f(S) = C . We construct an m-subsetM⊆ [n] such that
|{i : Λi ⊆M}| is maximized. Suppose, M′ =
⋃
i:Λi⊆M
Ri.
We have H(CM|CM′) = 0. Moreover H(S|CM) = 0.
This implies,
H(S|CM′) = 0.
Now we can select any ℓ-subset L of M′ and assume
that the eavesdropper observes that set. Therefore, H(S) =
H(S|CL) must be less than or equal to the number of symbols
in M′ \ L. Formally,
k = H(S) = H(S|CL) ≤ H(CM′ |CL) ≤ |M
′ \ L|
= |M′| − ℓ. (11)
This observation will lead us to eq. (8). We describe below,
the only remaining task: the method for constructing the set
M described above, and show that it gives us eq. (8). The
construction for M is given in algorithm 1.
Note that algorithm 1 may not actually give the set con-
taining the maximum number of Λi but it would suffice to
prove the bound in eq. (8). Let ν denote number of sets Λi
added to M0. We have, |Λi| ≤ r + 1, ∀i. So the maximum
size of the set added in each step is r + 1. Since |M| = m
4Data: Ri for all i
Result: M⊆ [n], |M| = m containing at least
⌊m/(r + 1)⌋ recovery sets
1 j = 0; Mj = ∅
2 choose any t ∈ [n]
3 while |Mj ∪ {Λt}| < m do
4 Mj+1 =Mj ∪ Λt
5 choose t /∈Mj+1
6 j = j + 1
7 end
8 if |Mj ∪ Λt| ≤ m then
9 Mj+1 =Mj ∪ Λt
10 else
11 I = any (m− |Mj |)-subset of [n] \Mj
12 Mj+1 =Mj ∪ I
13 end
14 j = j + 1
15 M =Mj
Algorithm 1: Constructing a set M ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} to
maximize |{i : Λi ⊆M}|
by construction, when the algorithm ends at line 9 we have
ν ≥
⌈
m
r+1
⌉
. If the algorithm ends at line 10 we must have,
ν ≥
⌊
m
r+1
⌋
. Evidently we have constructed a set M such that
|M′| = |M| − ν ≤ m−
⌊
m
r+1
⌋
. From eq. (11) we have,
k ≤ m−
⌊
m
r + 1
⌋
− ℓ. (12)
Using eq. (11) we can show the following,
Corollary 4. There exists a set J ⊆ [n] with ℓ ≤ |J | ≤
m−
⌊
m
r+1
⌋
such that,
H(S|CJ ) ≤ m−
⌊
m
r + 1
⌋
− |J |. (13)
Equation (13) gives an upper-bound on the maximum am-
biguity of the secret of an (n, k, ℓ,m, r)-scheme when the
eavesdropper has access to more than ℓ shares.
B. Constructions
It is possible to show matching achievability results to
theorem 2 by a number of different methods.
Theorem 5. There exists a (n, k, ℓ,m, r)-secret sharing
scheme such that eq. (7) is satisfied with equality.
In particular this theorem can be proved by constructing
a random linear network code. We delegate that proof to
Appendix B.
The achievability result also follows from [18], that gives
a construction for optimal secure LRC employing Gabidulin
codes to satisfy the security constraint. In the subsequent we
describe their method, adapted for our scenario, because this
will be useful later in our paper when we consider more
general secret sharing schemes.
An intuitive construction of ℓ-secure schemes comes by
replacing some inputs to a LRC with uniform random vari-
ables. Formally, consider a linear code C with code-length n
and dimension (k + ℓ). Let G = [G1 G2] ∈ Fn×(k+ℓ)q be
the generator matrix of this code such that G1 ∈ Fn×ℓq and
G2 ∈ Fn×kq . Let a ∈ Fk+ℓq be the input to the encoder of
C (i.e., the codeword is generated by multiplying a with the
generator matrix of C). Denote by s ∈ Fkq the input we want to
store securely. We construct an ℓ-secure secret sharing scheme
using C by taking,
a =
[
r
s
]
(14)
where r ∈ Fℓq is an instance of uniformly distributed random
vector. This scheme is ℓ-secure if and only if for any ℓ linearly
independent rows of G the corresponding rows of G1 are
linearly independent.
Lemma 6. Let gi = [gi1gi2 . . . gi(k+ℓ)], i ∈ [ℓ] be any ℓ
linearly independent rows of G. The secret sharing scheme
constructed in eq. (14) is ℓ-secure if and only if the corre-
sponding row vectors g1i = [gi1gi2 . . . giℓ], i ∈ [ℓ] of G1 are
linearly independent.
The proof of lemma 6 is given in Appendix A. Note that
using lemma 6 we can add the security property to any linear
code; we do not assume any locality property for the generator
matrix G. But, it is clear that if the generator matrix G has
locality r, then so would the scheme constructed in eq. (14).
The construction of an optimal (n, k, ℓ,m, r)q scheme is
described in the following.
Gabidulin precoding construction: Let N be an integer. The
points αi ∈ FqN , i ∈ [n] can be represented as vectors in
FNq and are said to be Fq-linearly independent when the
corresponding vectors over Fq are linearly independent. A
Gabidulin code from FkqN → F
n
qN , for input (f1f2 . . . fk), fi ∈
FqN , is obtained by evaluating the linearized polynomial
Θ(y) =
∑k
i=1 fiy
qi−1 at n Fq-linearly independent points
αi ∈ FqN , i ∈ [n]. The linearized polynomial Θ(y) has the
following linearity property,
Θ(ax+ by) = aΘ(x) + bΘ(y) (15)
for all x, y ∈ FqN and a, b ∈ Fq . Note that, we need N ≥ n
to obtain n Fq-linearly independent points in FqN .
Consider the generator matrix, G = [g1 . . .gn]T of a linear
(n, k + ℓ, r)q-optimal LRC, where gi = [gi1 . . . gi(k+ℓ)]T .
Consider a = (s r), where r is an instance of uniformly
distributed random variable in FℓqN and s ∈ F
k
qN , N ≥ n,
denotes the secret. First, a is precoded using a Gabidulin
code, Γ : Fk+ℓqN → F
k+ℓ
qN which is obtained by evaluating the
polynomial,
Ψa(y) =
k+ℓ∑
i=1
aiy
qi−1 (16)
at the Fq-linearly independent points αi ∈ FqN , i ∈ [k + ℓ].
Now, representing Γ(a) ∈ Fk+ℓ
qN
as a matrix of size (k +
ℓ) × N in Fq, each column of the matrix can be encoded
independently using the generator matrix G for the optimal
LRC to get (ci)ni=1 = c ∈ FnqN . It is easy to show that this
5construction is ℓ-secure. The optimality of the scheme then
follows from the optimality of the initial linear LRC. The proof
of security of this construction is given below.
Proof of theorem 5 with the Gabidulin construction:
Assume without loss of generality (wlog) that the eaves-
dropper observes E = [ℓ] ⊆ [n] symbols ci, i ∈ E . Let
G˜ = [g1 . . . gℓ]
T
. Further assume that the rank(G˜) = ℓ,
since otherwise the ℓ-strength eavesdropper is equivalent to
an rank(G˜)-strength eavesdropper. Let α˜i =
k+ℓ∑
j=1
gijαj , i ∈ E .
Then since G˜ is full-rank {α˜i}i∈E are Fq-linearly independent.
Therefore, using eq. (15) we have,
ci =
k+ℓ∑
j=1
gijΨa(αj)
= Ψa(
k+ℓ∑
j=1
gijαj) = Ψa(α˜i), i ∈ E .
Let R,S,C be the random variables corresponding to the
vector r, the secret s, and the node shares C = (Ci)i. To
prove security we use the secrecy lemma in [18, Lemma 4],
to show that H(CE) ≤ H(R) and H(R|S,CE) = 0 imply
H(S|CE) = H(S). Indeed, H(S|CE) ≤ H(S), and
H(S) +H(R) = H(S|R) +H(R)
= H(S,R) = H(S,CE ,R)
= H(CE) +H(S,R|CE)
= H(CE) +H(R|S,CE) +H(S|CE)
= H(CE) +H(S|CE) (17a)
≤ H(R) +H(S|CE) (17b)
where eqs. (17a) and (17b) follow from the assumptions
H(R|S,CE) = 0 and H(CE) ≤ H(R) respectively. On the
other hand, assuming that the eavesdropper also knows s (in
addition to cE ), she/he has
c˜i = ci −
k∑
j=1
sjα˜
qℓ+j−1
i =
ℓ∑
j=1
rjα˜
qj−1
i , i ∈ E .
Since B = [α˜q
j−1
i ]i∈E,j∈[ℓ] is full rank, the eavesdropper can
compute [c˜1 . . . c˜ℓ]B−1 = [r1 . . . rℓ]. Thus, H(R|S,CE) = 0.
Now H(CE) ≤ H(R), since |E| ≤ ℓ. Therefore, we have an
(n, k, ℓ,m, r)qN -secret sharing scheme.
C. Constructions with small alphabet size: equivalence with
maximal recoverability
Note that, the size of the alphabet/shares in the construction
of optimal secure scheme using Gabidulin codes is exponential
in the number of nodes. In this section, our aim is to show
that the construction of an optimal secure scheme with small
alphabet size will amount to finding a maximally recoverable
code over that alphabet. We use the construction in eq. (14)
to form a secure scheme from an optimal LRCs with a small
alphabet and analyze the conditions for that construction to
satisfy lemma 6. We assume (r+1)|n i.e. r+1 divides n for
simplicity in this subsection.
We will need the following definition of maximally recov-
erable codes [7].
Definition 2. Consider an (n, k, r)q-optimal LRC. Let Qj :
|Qj | = r + 1, j ∈ [n/(r + 1)] denote a partition of [n] such
that the recovery set of ith coordinate is,
Ri = Q(i) \ {i}, ∀i ∈ [n], (18)
whereQ(i) ∈ {Qj}j is the partition containing node i. Denote
such an LRC by (n, k, r, {Qj}j)q . The (n, k, r, {Qj}j)q LRC
is called maximally recoverable if the code obtained by
puncturing any one symbol from each Qj is maximum distance
separable (MDS).
Note that, in [8], it was pointed out that an optimal linear
LRC must have the recovery structure as in eq. (18).
The main objective of this section is to show that the im-
mediate construction of (n, k, ℓ,m, r)-secret-sharing scheme
from an optimal LRC is effective if and and only if the code
is maximally recoverable.
Lemma 7. For any linear (n, k+ ℓ, r, {Qj}j)q -optimal LRC
code with a generator matrix G ∈ Fn×(k+ℓ)q consider S ⊆
[n] : |S| = ℓ and |S ∩ Qj | ≤ r, j ∈ [n/(r + 1)]. Then, the
rows corresponding to S in G are linearly independent for
any ℓ such that
ℓ ≤ r − 1 +
(
r
⌊
k
r − 1
⌋
− k
)
(19)
Proof: Partition S as follows, S = ⋃j∈[n/(r+1)] Sj with
Sj = S ∩ Qj and let Λ := {j : Sj 6= 0}. Consider a set
S ′ ⊃ S : |S ′| ≤ k+ℓ and define S ′j := S ′∩Qj . Suppose that
we can construct S ′ with S ′j ≤ r, ∀j ∈ [n/(r + 1)] such that
the number of partitions Qj that contain r co-ordinates of S ′
is at least ⌈(k + ℓ)/r⌉ − 1. Let Ψ := {j : S ′j = r}. Thus,
|Ψ| ≥ ⌈(k + ℓ)/r⌉ − 1 (20)
Construct a set S ′′ ⊇ S ′ by adding k+ ℓ−|S ′| co-ordinates
to S ′ such that, |S′′ ∩Qj | ≤ r, ∀j ∈ [n/(r+1)]. Now at least
|Ψ| more co-ordinates are recoverable from S ′′. Note that the
input a for (n, k + ℓ, r, {Qj}j)q-optimal LRC is recoverable
from any m = (k + ℓ) + ⌈(k + ℓ)/r⌉ − 1 co-ordinates and
|S ′′|+ |Ψ| ≥ m. Thus, a is recoverable from cS′′ . Now, since
|S′′| = k+ℓ the rows of G corresponding to S ′′ (and hence S)
must be L.I. We are now left with the task of constructing a set
S ′ satisfying eq. (20) for the given S with |S| = ℓ satisfying
eq. (19). The construction is given below.
For |Λ| ≤ k/(r − 1) we can easily construct S ′. Since
|Λ| ≤ k/(r − 1) =⇒ |Λ|r ≤ k + ℓ, we can choose Ψ(⊇
Λ) : |Ψ| = ⌊k+ℓr ⌋. Now to each of the partitions {Sj}j∈Ψ
add r − |Sj | co-ordinates from Qj to get a set S ′ of size
r⌊(k + ℓ)/r⌋ ≤ k + ℓ. It is easy to see that this set satisfies
eq. (20).
Now assume that |Λ| > k/(r − 1). Choose any Ψ ⊆ Λ :
|Ψ| = ⌊k/(r − 1)⌋. Select any r − |Sj | co-ordinates from Qj
for all j ∈ Ψ. Adding these co-ordinates to S, we get S ′
satisfying |S ′| ≤ ⌊k/(r − 1)⌋(r − 1) + ℓ ≤ k + ℓ. Thus, from
eq. (19) we have,
|Ψ|+ 1− ⌈(k + ℓ)/r⌉ ≥ ⌊k/(r − 1)⌋ −
k + ℓ
r
6≥ ⌊k/(r − 1)⌋ −
k
r
− (1 + ⌊k/(r − 1)⌋ − k/r − 1/r)
= −(1− 1/r)
Since |{Qj : |Qj ∩ S ′| = r}|+ 1− ⌈(k + l)/r⌉ is an integer,
m′ + 1− ⌈(k + l)/r⌉ ≥ 0, S ′ satisfies eq. (20).
For ℓ < r, the construction (in eq. (14)) using an optimal
LRC code is ℓ-secure since any ℓ rows of G1 form an ℓ × ℓ
Vandermonde matrix. For ℓ > r, we have the following result,
using definition 2 and lemma 7.
Theorem 8. Consider a linear (n, k + ℓ, r, {Qj}j)q -optimal
LRC C. Then the construction in eq. (14) using code C is ℓ-
secure if there exists C′ ⊆ C of dimension ℓ such that C′ is max-
imally recoverable. Conversely, if the construction in eq. (14)
is ℓ-secure then there must exist a maximally recoverable code
C′ ⊆ C of dimension ℓ, for ℓ ≤ r − 1 + (r⌊k/(r − 1)⌋ − k)
Proof: Let G = [G1 G2] ∈ Fn×(k+ℓ)q be the generator
matrix of C where G1 ∈ Fn×ℓq . Let G1 be the generator matrix
of a maximally recoverable code C′. Consider a set D ⊆ [n]
of any ℓ linearly dependent rows of G1. Since C′ is maximally
recoverable, Qj ⊆ D for at least one j ∈ [n/(r + 1)]. Hence,
the corresponding rows in G must also be linearly dependent.
Thus, from lemma 6 the secret sharing construction in eq. (14)
must be ℓ-secure.
Now, suppose that C does not contain any subcode of
dimension ℓ which is maximally recoverable. Then, the code
generated by G1 is not maximally recoverable. Thus, there
would exist an S ⊆ [n] : |S| = ℓ and |S ∩ Qj | ≤ r, ∀j ∈
[n/(r + 1)] such that the rows in G1 corresponding to S
are linearly dependent. Now from lemma 7 we know that the
rows corresponding to S in G are not linearly dependent for
ℓ ≤ r − 1 + (r⌊k/(r − 1)⌋ − k). Hence, from lemma 6 the
secret sharing scheme cannot be ℓ secure.
Recently an optimal construction of locally repairable codes
was proposed in [24] by Tamo and Barg for general values of
the parameters n, k, and r and alphabet size of O(n). Our
theorem 8 implies that the secret sharing scheme constructed
in eq. (14) using such code is ℓ-secure if and only if the Tamo-
Barg codes are maximally recoverable. In general these codes
are not maximally recoverable. It should be noted that, it is
quite a nontrivial open problem to construct maximally recov-
erable codes with linear or even polynomial (in blocklength)
alphabet size [7].
In the next two sections we extend the notions and results
of section II to other generalized repair conditions related to
distributed storage.
III. SECURITY FOR SCHEMES WITH COOPERATIVE REPAIR
Cooperative repair for a locally repairable scheme addresses
simultaneous multiple failures in a distributed storage system
[19]2. To this end, we extend the definition in eq. (4) to a
(r, δ) scheme where any δ –instead of just one– shares can be
recovered from r other shares.
2There is a related notion of cooperative recovery in regenerating codes
[23] and security in such systems [12]. In this paper we are concerned with
only the local recovery problem, and not the regenerating problem.
Definition 3. A set C ⊆ Fnq is said to be (r, δ)-repairable if for
every ∆ ⊆ [n] : |∆| ≤ δ there exists a set R(∆) ⊆ [n] \∆ :
|R(∆)| ≤ r such that for all c, c′ ∈ C,
c∆ 6= c
′
∆ =⇒ cR(∆) 6= c
′
R(∆) (21)
Using definition 3 we can generalize the notion of an
(n, k, ℓ,m, r)q-secret sharing scheme. For this system we de-
rive an upper bound on the capacity k given n,m, ℓ, r, and δ.
Definition 4. An (n, k, ℓ,m, (r, δ))q-secret sharing scheme
consists of a randomized encoder f(.) that stores a file s ∈ Fkq
in n separate shares, such that the scheme is (r, δ)-repairable
(definition 3), satisfies the recovery condition (cf. eq. (2)) and
ℓ-secure (cf. eq. (3)).
A. The case of m =n
Error-correcting codes with (r, δ)-repairability were consid-
ered in [19] (ℓ = 0 or no security) and the following upper-
bound on the rate of such codes has been proposed, for the
case of m = n.
R =
k
n
≤
r
r + δ
. (22)
For the case of ℓ-secure codes we give an analogous upper
bound on the rate of a secret sharing scheme in the following.
Theorem 9. The rate R = k/n of an (n, k, ℓ, n, (r, δ))q secret
sharing scheme is bounded as,
R ≤
r
r + δ
−
ℓ
n
. (23)
Proof: For an (n, k, ℓ, (r, δ))q scheme we construct a
set of size m = n similar to algorithm 1 except instead of
choosing a set of size 1 in steps 2 and 5, we find a set of
size δ. Then using the same arguments we must have at least
ν = m/(r+δ) number of steps. Hence, subtracting the number
recoverable symbols δν from the m symbols we must have,
k + ℓ ≤ m− δν = n− δ
n
r + δ
=⇒
k + ℓ
n
≤
r
r + δ
.
Construction: Note that, any linear q-ary (r, δ)-repairable
error-correcting code of length n and dimension k will give
rise to a (n, k, 0, (r, δ))-secret sharing scheme. In [19, Sec. 6],
an (r, δ) repairable code has been constructed using bipartite
graphs of large girth. In particular, that construction results in
parameters such that
k
n
≥
r − δ
r + δ
.
It can also be seen from the discussion of section II-B
that Gabidulin precoding (eq. (16)) would give an ℓ-secure
construction with alphabet FqN , N ≥ n, from any optimal
linear (n, k+ℓ, 0, (r, δ))q-secret sharing scheme. Thus, for any
(n, k+ℓ, 0, (r, δ))q secret sharing scheme achieving the upper-
bound in eq. (22) we can achieve the corresponding upper-
bound in theorem 9. Hence, using the code of [19, Sec. 6]
7in conjunction with the Gabidulin precoding, it is possible to
obtain a rate of
k
n
≥
r − δ
r + δ
−
ℓ
n
,
which is an additive term of δr+δ away from the optimum
possible.
B. The case of m < n.
The bound for general case of m < n can be deduced
from the same arguments as above. In fact, by slightly gen-
eralizing algorithm 1, we get the following result: for any
(n, k, ℓ,m, (r, δ))q-secret sharing scheme ,
k + ℓ ≤ m−
⌊
m
r + δ
⌋
δ − h (24)
where h = (m mod (r + δ)− r)+ and x+ :=
{
0 x ≤ 0,
x x > 0.
Note that, this results in slightly weaker bound for the
case of m = n than eq. (23). In general for m < n and
arbitrary values of ℓ, we do not have any good construction that
will be close to the bound. While the expander-graph based
constructions of (r, δ)-locally repairable codes from [19] can
be generalized, their performance is very far from the bound
of eq. (24).
IV. SECURITY FOR REPAIRABLE CODES ON GRAPHS
Another extension of local repair property for distributed
storage has recently been proposed in [13], [14]. Consider a
Distributed Storage System as a directed graph G such that a
node of the graph represents a node of the Distributed Storage
System and each node can connect to only its out-neighbors for
repair. We define an ℓ-secure code in this scenario as follows.
A. Repairable Codes on Graph
Definition 5. Let G = ([n], E) be a graph on n nodes.
An (n, k, ℓ,m,G)q-secret sharing scheme consists of a ran-
domized encoder f that can store a uniformly random secret
S ∈ Fkq on n shares/nodes, C = f(S),C ∈ Fnq , such that the
system is ℓ-secure (cf. eq. (3)) and the data can be recovered
from any m shares (cf. eq. (2)). In addition the share of any
node can be recovered from its neighbors i.e.
H(Ci|CN(i)) = 0
where N(i) = {j ∈ [n] : (i, j) ∈ E} denotes the neighbors
(out-neighbors in the case of a directed graph) of node i in
the graph G = ([n], E).
A bound on the capacity of such a scheme in directed graphs
for ℓ = 0 (no security) was derived in [15],
m ≥ k + max
U∈I(G):
|N(U)|≤k−1
|U | (25)
where I(G) denotes the set of induced acyclic subgraphs in
G, and N(U) := ∪i∈UN(i) \ U denotes the neighbors of U .
For undirected graphs we have the same bound with I(G)
denoting the collection of all independent sets of the graph.
The lower bound on m for an ℓ-secure scheme on a graph G
is given in the following.
Theorem 10. For any (n, k, ℓ,m,G)q-secret sharing scheme
on a directed graph G, m satisfies the following lower bound,
m ≥ k + ℓ+ max
U∈I(G):
|N(U)|≤ℓ+k−1
|U | (26)
where I(G) denotes the set of induced acyclic graphs in G.
Proof: Since any m co-ordinates in the shares C =
(Ci)i∈[n] can recover the secret S we must have,
m ≥ |W |+ 1 (27)
for all W ⊆ [n] such that the H(S|CW ) > 0. Let U be an
acyclic subgraph U ∈ I(G), such that N(U) ≤ ℓ + k − 1.
Construct a set V ⊇ {U ∪N(U)} by adding any ℓ+ k− 1−
|N(U)| nodes to U ∪N(U). Thus, |V | = k+ ℓ+ |U | − 1. We
show that H(S|CV ) > 0 for any such V .
Note that for any three random X,Y, Z variables we must
have,
H(X |Y, Z) = H(X,Z|Y )−H(Z|Y )
= H(X |Y ) +H(Z|X,Y )−H(Z|Y )
≥ H(X |Y )−H(Z). (28)
Assume that the eavesdropper selects an ℓ-subset E ⊆ [n]
in the set V . Then, since the eavesdropper must not get any
information about the secret,
H(S|CE) = H(S) (29)
Since the sub-graph U is acyclic the nodes in U must be a
function of the leaf nodes and the nodes in N(U). Now, the
leaf nodes must also be a function of N(U) since their out-
neighbors can only be in N(U). Therefore,
H(S|CV ) = H(S|CN(U)) = H(S|CE ,CN(U)\E)
(a)
≥ H(S|CE)−H(CN(U)\E)
(b)
= H(S)−H(CN(U)\E)
(c)
> 0
where (a) and (b) follow from eq. (28) and eq. (29) respec-
tively, and (c) is is true since |N(U) \ E| = k − 1.
When m = n, i.e. when the scheme does not need to protect
against catastrophic failures, we can formulate a converse
bound for repairable codes on graphs that does not follow
directly from the above theorem.
Theorem 11. Consider an (n, k, ℓ, n,G)q secret sharing
scheme. The secrecy capacity of the scheme satisfies the
following upper-bound.
k ≤ n− |U | − |ℓ| (30)
where U is the largest acyclic induced subgraph in G when G
is a directed graph, and it is the largest independent set when
G is undirected.
Proof: We will show the proof for G directed. Consider
the shares CU corresponding to the nodes in U ⊆ [n]. The
8recovery set of any node in U can contain its children in U or
co-ordinates in [n] \ U . Since U is ayclic, all the leaf nodes
of U have recovery sets in [n] \ U . Thus, we can recover
all the leaf nodes from the co-ordinates in [n] \ U . Now, we
can recursively recover all the co-ordinates of U from the co-
ordinates in [n] \ U . Thus,
H(CU |C [n]\U ) = 0 (31)
Equation (31) is true because all the leaf nodes in U must
have their recovery sets in [n]\U . And by recovering the leaf
nodes we can recover all nodes in U . Now, since H(S|C) = 0
we must have from eq. (31),
H(S|C [n]\U ) = 0 (32)
Now, suppose that the eavesdropper selects an ℓ-subset E ∈
[n] \ U . Then, we must have,
H(S) = H(S|CE) (33)
Therefore, using eqs. (32) and (33) we have,
H(C [n]\U |CE) = H(C [n]\U |CE) +H(S|C[n]\U ,CE)
= H(S,C [n]\U |CE)
= H(S|CE) +H(C[n]\U |S,CE)
= H(S) +H(C [n]\U |S,CE)
=⇒ H(S) = H(C [n]\U |CE)−H(C[n]\U |S,CE)
=⇒ H(S) ≤ H(C [n]\U |CE) ≤ n− |U | − ℓ.
Note that the bound in eq. (30) parallels the feedback vertex
set upper-bound in [15, Prop. 11]. Here, a feedback vertex set
of a graph is a set of nodes such that every cycle in the graph
has a vertex in the set.
B. Achievable Schemes for Secure Repairable Codes on
Graphs
In this section we consider construction of (n, k, ℓ,m,G)q-
secret sharing scheme only when m = n. We do not have any
nontrivial construction for the case of m < n.
Consider a secret sharing scheme for the case of undirected
graphs (definition 5). A maximum matching M(G) of the
graph G is defined as the set of edges of maximum cardinality
such that no two edges have a vertex in common. To construct
a recoverable scheme for this code, with input x ∈ F|M(G)|,
we assign a coordinate of x to both vertices for every edge in
M(G). For recoverability, we note that a symbol in vertex v
can be recovered from u, where (v, u) ∈M(G).
Suppose |M(G)| = k + ℓ. Consider the vector input x ∈
Fk+ℓ to the above scheme. We set x = G × [s r], s ∈
Fk, r ∈ Fℓ, where s is the secret, r is an instance of a uniform
random vector, and G is the (k + ℓ) × (k + ℓ) Vandermonde
matrix G = [αj−1i ]ij with {αi}i distinct elements in Fq . Thus,
from lemma 6, we see that this scheme is ℓ-secure as well as
recoverable.
The capacity of this scheme is k = |M(G)|−ℓ ≥ n−|U|2 −ℓ,
where U is the maximum independent set. This is true since if
we remove both end-vertices of the edges of the matching then
we are left with an independent set. Compared to eq. (30), we
are an additive term of at most n−|U|2 away from what is the
maximum possible.
For directed graphs G = ([n], E) we use the repairable
codes presented in [15] below to construct a secure scheme.
Suppose that the graph has K := k+ ℓ vertex disjoint cycles.
Then it is easy to see that we can form a locally repairable
scheme capable of storing k + ℓ symbols (one symbol per
cycle) by repeating the same symbol on every vertex in a
cycle. Hence, it is possible to store as many symbols as the
maximum number of vertex disjoint cycles in the graph. In
[15], it was shown that we can do better by using vector codes.
We describe below the vector linear LRC codes constructed
in [15].
Consider the set P of all cycles in G([n], E). Suppose, Π :
P → Q assigns a rational number to every directed cycle. Let
V (C), C ∈ P denote the vertices of the cycle C. Let K denote
the maximum value of
∑
C∈P Π(C), over all such mappings
Π, under the following constraint,∑
C:i∈V (C)
Π(C) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n].
Let the optimal assignment Π on P be denoted as Π(C) =
n(C)
p , where n(C), p ∈ Z
+
. It is possible to find this optimum
by solving a linear program. Then [15] constructs a vector
LRC for the graph G in Fq with storage capability of pK
symbols and per node storage equal to p symbols.
Let s ∈ Fpkq , r ∈ Fpℓq represent the secret and an in-
stance of a uniform random vector, respectively. We obtain
x ∈ FpKq ,K := k + ℓ, by x = G × [s r], where G is
a pK × pK Vandermonde matrix G = [αj−1i ]ij with {αi}i
distinct elements in Fq. x is then stored in the graph using the
scheme described above. Since an ℓ-strength eavesdropper can
only observe at most pℓ co-ordinates in a, we can use lemma 6
to see that the scheme is ℓ-secure as well as recoverable.
It is known (cf. [15]) that, 4K ln 4K ln log2 4K ≥ n− |U |,
for U being the maximum acyclic induced subgraph. Hence,
we must have,
k ≥
n− |U |
c logn log logn
− ℓ.
However this achievability result is quite far away from the
bound of eq. (30).
V. PERFECT SECRET SHARING AND GENERAL ACCESS
STRUCTURES
So far in this paper we were concentrating on a secret
sharing scheme that is not perfect, i.e., the access structure
and the block-list are not complementary. In this section we
provide results regarding existence of locally repairable of
perfect secret sharing schemes and the relation between sizes
of shares and secret in those schemes.
A. Perfect access structures with locality
To make the (n, k, ℓ,m, r) secret sharing scheme perfect,
we must have m = ℓ + 1. This results in a threshold secret-
sharing scheme. Now, from eq. (8) we have,
k ≤ 1−
⌊
ℓ+ 1
r + 1
⌋
.
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any secret sharing scheme works when r ≥ m (local repair in
this case imply full revelation of secret) only trivial locally
repairable codes are possible for threshold secret sharing
schemes. This implies the following statement.
Proposition 12. A threshold secret sharing scheme is not
locally repairable.
Note that, perfect secret sharing schemes are a natural
generalization of threshold schemes. Although for threshold
schemes the locality cannot be small/nontrivial, we show
that this is not true for general access structures and perfect
schemes. Indeed, the following is true.
Proposition 13. There exists an access structure As, for which
a perfect secret sharing scheme is possible with arbitrary non-
trivial locality r i.e. r < minA∈As |A|.
Proof: Let n, κ be such that r|κ and (r+1)|n. Consider
an (n, κ, r, {Qj}j) maximally recoverable LRC (definition 2).
We know that such codes exist from [7]. Now, we use the
Gabidulin precoding method described above to construct a
(n, k = 1, ℓ = κ − 1,m = κ(1 + 1/r), r) secret sharing
scheme from this code.
Define the access structure to be As = {A ⊆ [n] :∑n/(r+1)
j=1 min{|A ∩ Qj |, r} ≥ κ}. Now given any A ∈ As,
a user accessing the shares corresponding to A can determine
the secret s0 because the set always contains k shares of a
punctured (nr/(r + 1), κ)-MDS code.
For a perfect secret sharing scheme the block-list is given
by Bs = {B :
∑n/(r+1)
j=1 min{|B ∩ Qj |, r} < κ}. Assume
that the eavesdropper has access to a set B ∈ Bs. Construct
the following set of size at most κ− 1 from B,
B′ = ∪
n/(r+1)
j=1 N
′
j , B
′ ⊆ B
where N ′j ⊆ Nj, Nj = B ∩ Qj is obtained by removing any
one co-ordinate if |Nj | > r, otherwise N ′j = Nj . Note that
|B′| < κ. Since all the shares in B are recoverable from B′ ⊆
B, an eavesdropper with access to the nodes in B is equivalent
to an eavesdropper with access to B′. And since |B′| ≤ ℓ =
κ − 1, the eavesdropper does not get any information about
the secret.
Can the above proposition be made general? Is it possible
to characterize the locality for general secret sharing schemes?
Shamir’s [22] perfect threshold secret sharing scheme for the
access structure As = {A ⊆ [n] : |A| ≥ k} is one of the first
general construction of secret sharing protocols. The scheme
is defined for a scalar secret s ∈ F and a set of n participating
nodes P . The scheme uses an (n, k) Reed Solomon code
defined using the polynomial σ(x) = s +
∑k−1
i=1 rix
i
, where
ri are instances of uniform random variables in F.
Ito, Shaito, and Nishizeki [11] define a generalization of
Shamir’s scheme that works for arbitrary monotone access
structures. Define a maximal element B ∈ B as a set such
that A ) B =⇒ A /∈ A. Similarily, define a minimal set
A ∈ A as a set such that B ( A =⇒ B /∈ A. Consider the
set of maximal elements of the block-list B, denoted B†. The
scheme uses the generator polynomial σ(x) = s+
|B†|−1∑
i=1
rix
i
to generate |B†| shares {cB}B∈B† – one share corresponding
to each maximal set in B. The shares are distributed such that
each user gets the shares corresponding to the subset it does
not belong to, i.e. participant node p gets the shares
{cB : p /∈ B,B ∈ B
†} (34)
Now, suppose that share of a node p is lost in a secure code
with participants P and block-list B. To recover the share of
p we access the shares of participants in the set R(p) where
the optimal set R(p) is
R(p) = min
R:∀B∈B†,p/∈B R 6⊆B
|R|. (35)
To have non-trivial locality, one must have maxp |R(p)| to be
strictly less than the maximal sets in the block-list.
B. Size of a share for perfect secret sharing with locality
We know that, for perfect secret sharing schemes, the size of
the secret cannot be larger than the size of a share [2, Lemma
2]. Let us see why this statement is true. Let the secret s
belong to a domain K and the share of node j belong to Kj .
Assume that there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme which
realizes the access structure A when |K| < |Kj |. Let B ⊆ [n]
be a minimal set in A such that j ∈ B. Define B′ = B \ {j}.
Then, since the secret sharing scheme is perfect, for every
value of the the shares in Bj all secrets in K must have the
same probability. Thus, since the value of the shares of B
determine the secret completely there must exist an injective
mapping from K to Kj . But since |Kj | < |K| this cannot be
possible.
In [5] the minimum node storage required for arbitrary
monotone access structures is analyzed. In that paper, an
access structure was constructed for which the sizes of the
shares has to be n/log(n) times the size of the secret for
any perfect scheme. For secret sharing schemes with local
repairability and fixed recovery sets, all monotone access
structures are not feasible. The minimal sets of the access
structure cannot include any recovery set. Here, we extend
the result in [5] to the restricted class of monotone access
structures.
Assume (r + 1)|n. Suppose that the secret denoted by the
random variable S is stored on n shares as Ci, i ∈ [n] and
the shares have locality r (eq. (4)). Consider a partition of [n],
Qj : Qj , j ∈ [n/(r+1)] such that the recovery sets are given
by eq. (18). For a perfect secret sharing scheme on [n] with
monotone access structure As, the minimal sets A⋆s of As,
must satisfy,
A ∈ A⋆s =⇒ A 6⊇ Qj . (36)
Denote this class of monotone access structures with Ms. We
have the following result for the minimum size of a share for
secret sharing schemes with access structure As ∈ Ms.
Theorem 14. Consider distribution of shares of secret S to
n nodes with locality r, recovery sets as in eq. (18). Then,
there is an access structure As ∈Ms (eq. (36)), such that any
perfect scheme for As, if exists, must satisfy,
α ≥
(r + 1)n
r logn
H(S). (37)
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where α is the average entropy of the shares.
Proof: First, let us define a polymatroid (Q = {[n], S}, φ)
as follows,
φ(A) =
H(cA)
H(S)
, A ⊆ [n] (38a)
φ(A,S) =
H(cA, S)
H(S)
, A ⊆ [n] (38b)
A polymatroid function must satisfy the following properties,
P1 φ(A) ≥ 0 for all A ⊆ Q, φ(∅) = 0
P2 φ is monotone i.e. A ⊆ B ⊆ Q, then φ(A) ≤ φ(B)
P3 φ is submodular i.e. φ(A)+φ(B) ≥ φ(A∪B)+φ(A∩B)
for any A,B ⊆ Q
Note that, the definition in eq. (38) satisfies all the conditions
above. In addition, the definition satisfies the following prop-
erties,
Pa φ(A,S) = φ(A), for every A ∈ As
Pb φ(A,S) = φ(A) + 1, for every A /∈ As
which easily follow from the recovery and the security prop-
erties i.e. H(S|cB) = H(S) and H(S|cA) = 0, A ∈ As and
B ∈ Bs = 2
[n] −As and the definition in eq. (38).
Using properties (P1) to (P3) and properties (Pa) and (Pb)
we have the following result, for any A,B ∈ As such that
A ∩B /∈ As,
φ(A,S) + φ(B,S) ≥ φ((A ∪B), S) + φ((A ∩B), S)
=⇒ φ(A) + φ(B) ≥ φ(A ∪B) + φ(A ∩B) + 1 (39)
Consider the set M of size η such that (r + 1)|η and it
contains η/(r + 1) partitions Qj . Another set N ⊆ [n] \M :
|N | = ν := 2η − (r + 2)η/(r+1) + 1 is chosen such that
|N ∩ Qj | ≤ r, ∀j. The parameter η for the size of the sets
M,N is chosen to be the largest possible, i.e. the maximum
η satisfying,
η −
⌊
η
r + 1
⌋
+ 2η − (r + 2)η/(r+1) + 1 ≤ n
r
r + 1
(40)
Now, construct a sequence {Mi}ν−1i=0 , for Mi ∈ 2M of
length ν, such that it satisfies the following conditions for
all sets Mi in the sequence,
C1 If for any partition Qj ,Qj∩ (Mi−Mi+1) 6= ∅ and |Qj ∩
Mi| ≥ r, then |Qj ∩Mi+1| < r
C2 Mi 6⊆Mi′ , i < i′
To construct the sequence {Mi}i of length ν satisfying con-
ditions C1 and C2, we first construct a sequence {M ′i}
2η−1
i=0 ,
M ′i ⊆ M : |M
′
i | ≤ |M
′
i+1|. It is easy to see that all subse-
quences of {A′i} satisfy condition C2. From this sequence we
remove all sets M ′i , i ≥ 1 such that |(M0 −M ′i) ∩ Qj | ≤ 1.
Note that, the number of the sets removed is,∑
1≤i≤η/r+1
(
η/(r + 1)
i
)
(r + 1)i = (r + 2)η/(r+1) − 1.
The sequence {Mi}i thus constructed has length ν. To see that
this sequence satisfies condition C1 note that |(M0 −Mi) ∩
Qj | > 1, ∀i ≥ 1 implies that {Mi}i satisfies condition C1.
Thus the constructed sequence satisfies conditions C1 and C2.
Let N = {b1, . . . , bν−1}. Define another sequence of sets
Ni = {b1, . . . , bi}, i ∈ [ν − 1] and N0 = ∅. Consider a
monotone access structure As that contains the sets Ui :=
Mi ∪ Ni, i ∈ {0, . . . , ν − 2}. Let the minimal sets in this
access structure be,
A⋆s =
{
A ⊆ Ui : |A ∩ Qj | = min{|A ∩ Qj |, r}, ∀i ∈
[
n
r + 1
]}
.
(41)
Thus, As ∈ Ms.
Consider the following sets P = Ni ∪M and Q = Mi+1 ∪
Ni+1. Since P ⊇ Ui and Q ⊇ Ui+1, P,Q ∈ As. Now, P ∩
Q = Ni∪Mi+1. From condition C1 and eq. (41), we see that
there exists a set A⋆ ∈ A⋆s, A⋆ ⊆ Ui such that P ∩ Q ( A⋆.
Therefore, P ∩Q /∈ As. Applying eq. (39) on P,Q, we have,
[φ(Ni ∪M)− φ(Ni ∪Mi+1)]
− [φ(Ni+1 ∪M)− φ(Ni+1 ∪Mi+1)] ≥ 1. (42)
Using property (P3) we have,
φ(Ni+1 ∪Mi+1)−φ(Ni ∪Mi+1) ≥ φ(Ni+1)−φ(Ni). (43)
Thus, combining eqs. (43) and (44) we have,
[φ(Ni ∪M)− φ(Ni)]− [φ(Ni+1 ∪M)− φ(Ni+1)] ≥ 1.
(44)
Adding eq. (44) for i ∈ {0, . . . , ν − 3} we have,
φ(M)− [φ(Nν−2 ∪M)− φ(Nν−2)] ≥ ν − 2. (45)
Thus, from the recoverability property we have φ(M) ≤
ηr/(r + 1)α. Since, M ∈ As and Nν−2 6∈ As, φ(Nν−2 ∪
M)− φ(Nν−2) ≥ 1. Thus, we have from eq. (45),
α ≥ (r + 1)
2η − (r + 2)η/(r+1)
ηr
H(S). (46)
Since, η = Ω(log n) and (r + 2)1/(r+1) < 2 from eq. (40),
eq. (46) asympototically (with n) gives,
α ≥
(
r + 1
r
)
n
logn
H(S).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Consider the submatrix Hℓ×(k+ℓ) of G corresponding to
ℓ rows, Iℓ ⊆ [n]. Assume that the eavesdropper observes
Iℓ. Wlog assume that rank(H) = ℓ, since the eavesdropper
effectively observes rank(H) shares.
” ⇐= ” Assume that any ℓ rows of G1 corresponding to ℓ
L.I. rows of G are L.I. Thus, rank(H1) = ℓ by assumption.
Let c = Ga and H = [H1 H2] where H1 is ℓ× ℓ and H2 is
ℓ× k. Then,
H1r = cIℓ −H2s (47)
Now, given cIℓ , for every s there is a unique solution to r =
H1
−1(cIℓ − H2s). Since, each of those vectors are equally
probable the eavesdropper does not get any information about
s.
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” =⇒ ” Conversely, suppose that H1 is not full rank. (but
rank(H) = ℓ by assumption). If for a given cIℓ there does not
exist a solution to eq. (47) for some s ∈ Fkq then H(s|cIℓ) <
H(s). This happens iff for some a ∈ Fk+ℓq ,
Ha− colspan(H2) 6⊆ colspan(H1) (48)
where colspan(.) denotes the column span of a matrix and
Ha − colspan(H2) = {Ha − v : v ∈ colspan(H2)}. Now,
colspan(H2) 6⊆ colspan(H1) since dim(colspan(H1, H2)) =
ℓ and dim(colspan(H1)) < ℓ by assumption. Thus, eq. (48)
is satisfied for a = 0 which implies that in this case the
eavesdropper does get some information about s.
APPENDIX B
ACHIEVABILITY USING LINEAR NETWORK CODES
In this appendix, we show that the limit derived in theorem 2
is achievable using a random linear network code (LNC). The
rest of this section is devoted to the proof of theorem 5 via the
technique provided in [16]. We assume that k0 is such that,
m = k0 + k0/r − 1 (49)
For simplicity, further assume that r divides k0 and (r + 1)
divides n.
Our roadmap for the proof is the following. We analyze
the network flow graph in fig. 1, that has been adapted and
modified from [16]. We first show that this graph has multicast
capacity k0. Further there exists an LNC for this graph which
corresponds to an (n, k0, 0,m, r)-secret sharing scheme. Then,
we impose additional constraints on the LNC for the graph in
fig. 1 to get an ℓ-secure scheme, i.e., an (n, k = k0−ℓ, ℓ,m, r)-
scheme. Clearly this satisfies eq. (7).
We start by describing the graph in fig. 1 (Left). This graph,
G(n, k0,m, r) consists of a source node X that transmits k0
q-ary symbols to T =
(
n
m
)
data collectors DCµ, µ ∈ [T ]. We
assume that X transmit the secret s ∈ Fk0q . The unit for the
edge capacity is taken to be one q-ary symbol per channel use.
The nodes Fν , ν ∈ [r] connect to the source X through links
with capacity k0/r. The edges that connect Γρ, ρ ∈ [ nr+1 ]
to Y ini , i ∈ [n], has capacity r. All the rest of the edges
have unit capacity. Each of Γρ, ρ ∈ [ nr+1 ] have r incoming
edges from Fν , ν ∈ [r]. The edges (X,Fν) are broken
into k0/r unit capacity edges and labelled s1, s2, . . . , sk0 as
shown in the subgraph in fig. 1 (Right). Node Fν connects
to the source X through edges {sν+(λ−1)r}
k0/r
λ=1 , ν ∈ [r].
Let us denote the subset of nodes {Γρ, {Y in(ρ−1)(r+1)+j}
r+1
j=1,
{Y out(ρ−1)(r+1)+j}
r+1
j=1} as the ρth repair group.
A single network use corresponds to a sequence of single
data transmission on every edge. Assume that, data transmitted
on the edges (Y ini , Y outi ), i ∈ [n] in a single network use
correspond to the n shares of the secret (i.e., n symbols of
f(s), where f is the randomized encoding). Note that, the
data collectors connect to m nodes (shares) and obtain all of
what X transmits: this must be satisfied for all m-subsets (all
data collectors). We use the network G(n, k0,m, r) to show
the existence of a linear (n, k0, 0,m, r)-secret sharing scheme.
Lemma 15. Given that the network G(n, k0,m, r) has mul-
ticast capacity k0, there exists a linear network code with
repairability r for this network and the scheme correspond-
ing to the data transmitted on the edges (Y ini , Y outi ) is an
(n, k0, 0,m, r)-secret sharing scheme.
In the following we show that the network G(n, k0,m, r)
has multicast capacity k9.
Definition 6. A min-cut for any two nodes v, u in
G(n, k0,m, r), denoted MinCut(v, u), is defined as a subset
of directed edges of minimum aggregate capacity such that if
these edges are removed, then there does not exist a path from
v to u in the graph G(n, k0,m, r). Let |MinCut(v, u)| denote
the aggregate capacity of the edges in MinCut(v, u).
It has been shown [1], [10] that the minimum of the min-
cuts between a single source and multiple sinks corresponds
to the multicast capacity of the source. We show that for
G(n, k0,m, r) this quantity, minµ∈[T ] |MinCut(X,DCµ)|, is
equal to k0.
Lemma 16. For G(n, k0,m, r) the multicast capacity is k0.
That is,
min
µ∈[T ]
|MinCut(X,DCµ)| = k0. (50)
Proof: For k0 satisfying eq. (49) we have,
m = k0 +
k0
r
− 1 = (k0/r − 1)(r + 1) + r. (51)
Suppose that the minimum in eq. (50) only contains an
n1-subset E of edges in {(X,Fν)}ν∈[r]. Assume wlog that
E = {(X,F1), . . . , (X,Fn1)}. Consider the data collector
DCµ that connects to γρ, ρ ∈ [n/(r+1)] nodes in each of the
repair groups. If γρ ≥ r−n1 the min-cut should include all the
edges {(Fn1+1,Γρ), . . . , (Fr,Γρ)}. Otherwise if γρ < r − n1
the min-cut includes all the γρ edges (Y ini , Y outi ) in the ρth
repair group connected to DCµ. Therefore, the minimum in
eq. (50) would correspond to the data collector that covers
entirely as many repair groups as possible. From eq. (51) we
see that for a such data collector γρ ≥ (r − n1) for all ρ for
which γρ > 0 and for all 0 ≤ n1 ≤ r. Therefore,
min
µ
|MinCut(X,DCµ)| =
k0
r
(r − n1) + n1
k0
r
= k0
We know therefore that a random LNC achieves the
multicast capacity k0 for this network. This random LNC
corresponds to a secret-sharing scheme with n shares such
that the secret in Fk0q can be recovered by looking at any
m shares. Now to satisfy the local repairability constraint
for this LNC, consider the subgraph containing the nodes
in the ρth repair group. Another set of local decoding re-
quirements are imposed on this subgraph. For each r-subset
of nodes in any local repair group, a local data collector
LDi, i ∈ [n] connecting to these nodes should be able to
decode the input to Γρ. There are in total n such local decoding
requirements. These decoding requirements are similar to the
local repairability requirements for the network flow graph
considered in [16]. Let zρ ∈ Frq denote the data received by
Γρ. Let Ni denote the r × r local encoding matrix, for the
edges {(Γρ, Y in(ρ−1)(r+1)+j)}j∈[r+1]\{i} corresponding to ith
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Fig. 1: Left: The information flow-graph G(n, k0,m, r) adapted from [16]. The left-most vertex is the source node X . The
T =
(
n
m
)
vertices DCµ are the destination nodes (referred to as the data collectors). Each DC is connected to a different
m-tuple of Y outi nodes. Each of the intermediate nodes Fν , ν ∈ [r] have out-going edges to all the nodes Γρ, ρ ∈
[
n
r+1
]
. Right:
Equivalent representation for the subgraph containing nodes Fν and the source X .
local data collector. Therefore, the data received by the ith
local decoder is,
zρNi, i ∈ {(ρ− 1)(r + 1) + 1, . . . , ρ(r + 1)} (52)
We see that, for any local data collector LDi to recover the
data from the node Γρ matrix Ni must be full rank. Since
we know that for a large enough alphabet size q we can
satisfy these constraints [16, lemma 4], there must exist an
LNC that satisfies the local repair requirements. Therefore,
we can construct an (n, k0, 0,m, r)-secret-sharing scheme.
Suppose we write the secret as s = (s1, . . . , sk0), and term
s1, . . . , sk0 as the information symbols. Now, for the random
LNC obtained above that satisfy the repairability and recovery
requirements, we relabel k = k0 − ℓ information symbols
{sℓ+1, . . . , sk0} from the source X as secure information
symbols and the choose each of the rest ℓ symbols {s1, . . . , sℓ}
according to a uniformly random distribution in Fq. For such a
random LNC to be ℓ-secure any eavesdropper EDτ , τ ∈ [
(
n
ℓ
)
]
connecting to any ℓ nodes Y outi may be able to recover at
most the redundant ℓ symbols {s1, . . . , sℓ} and should have
full ambiguity about {sℓ+1, . . . , sk0}. We show that these
additional security constraints can be satisfied for a random
LNC with large enough alphabet and hence we have an
(n, k, ℓ,m, r)-secret-sharing scheme satisfying eq. (7).
Note that if a code is secure against an eavesdropper who
can observe any of the ℓ shares, it must be secure against any
adversary who can only observe less than ℓ shares. Therefore,
for ℓ > r we can ignore all eavesdroppers who choose all
the (r + 1) shares of the same repair group. Since one of the
shares in a repair group can be recovered from the other r
shares, an eavesdropper who reads t entire repair groups is
observing effectively only ℓ − t shares. Therefore, we only
need to consider the eavesdroppers that observe a maximum
of r shares in a repair group. Let us denote this sub-set of
eavesdropper as EDτ , τ ∈ W ′,W ′ ⊆ [
(
n
ℓ
)
].
If (c1, . . . , cn) are the n shares for the secret s, we must
have the data transmitted on the edges (Y ini , Y outi ) with the
following linear form,


c1
.
.
.
cn

 =


a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,k0
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,k0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
an,1 an,2 · · · an,k0




s1
.
.
.
sk0

 = As. (53)
We claim that the security against an eavesdropper EDτ , τ ∈
W ′ is equivalent to a full-rank requirement on a ℓ × ℓ sub-
matrix of A.
Lemma 17. Let Eτ = {eτ1 , eτ2 , . . . , eτℓ } ⊆ [n] denotes the
shares an eavesdropper EDτ can observe. We have,
cEτ = A
τ
1s[ℓ] +A
τ
2s[k0]\[ℓ]. (54)
If for all eavesdroppers EDτ , τ ∈ W ′ the ℓ× ℓ matrix Aτ1 is
full-rank then the LNC is ℓ-secure.
Proof: Suppose for some specific τ ∈ W ′,
Aτ1 =


ae1 ,1 ae1,2 · · · ae1,ℓ
ae2 ,1 ae2,2 · · · ae2,ℓ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
aeℓ,1 aeℓ,2 · · · aeℓ,ℓ

 ;A
τ
2 =


ae1,ℓ+1 · · · ae1 ,k0
ae2,ℓ+1 · · · ae2 ,k0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
aeℓ,ℓ+1 · · · aeℓ,k0

 .
Since Aτ1 is full rank, there must be a unique solution
to s1, s2, . . . , sℓ for every value of cEτ and every value of
{sℓ+1, . . . , sk0} ∈ F
k0
q . Hence, we have,
H(s[ℓ]|cEτ , s[k0]\[ℓ]) = 0
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We therefore have the following chain of inequalities that
establishes that the eavesdropper does not get any information
about the secret from his observation.
I(s[k0]\[ℓ]; cEτ ) = H(cEτ ) − H(cEτ |s[k0]\[ℓ]) ≤
ℓ − H(cEτ |s[k0]\[ℓ]) + H(cEτ |s[ℓ], s[k0]\[ℓ]) =
ℓ − I(cEτ , s[ℓ]|s[k0]\[ℓ]) = ℓ − H(s[ℓ]|s[k0]\[ℓ]) +
H(s[ℓ]|cEτ , s[k0]\[ℓ]) = ℓ−H(s[ℓ]) = ℓ− ℓ = 0.
We also have the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Consider the subgraph Ge formed by removing
the edges sℓ+1, . . . , sk0 from the graph G(n, k0,m, r). For this
modified network graph the multicast capacity between the
source and the eavesdroppers EDτ , τ ∈ W ′ is ℓ i.e.
min
τ∈W′
|MinCut(X,EDτ )| = ℓ.
Proof: It is easy to see from the network structure that
min-cut for every eavesdropper EDτ , τ ∈ W ′ corresponds to
all the edges (Y ini , Y outi ) to which an eavesdropper connects
in each repair group. Since, every eavesdropper in W ′ connects
to ℓ nodes, the minimum mincut is also ℓ.
Consider the eavesdropper EDτ , τ ∈ W ′ which connects
to t1, t2, . . . , tn/(r+1) nodes in each of the repair groups.
Therefore, we have
n/(r+1)∑
ρ=1
tρ = ℓ
where 0 ≤ tρ ≤ r, ∀ρ ∈ [n/(r + 1)]. Let N ′ρ, ρ ∈ [n/(r +
1)] denote the tρ × r local encoding sub-matrix of Nρ (see,
eq. (52)) for the edges (Γρ, Y ini ) connecting the eavesdropper
to the ρth repair group. Also, let Dρ, ρ ∈ [n/(r + 1)] denote
the r×ℓ matrix corresponding to the local encoding vectors for
(Fν ,Γρ), ν ∈ [r], for the induced graph Ge described above.
The matrix Aτ1 from lemma 17 can be written as,
Aτ1 =


N ′1D1
N ′2D2
.
.
.
N ′ n
r+1
D n
r+1

 . (55)
We need all of the matrices Aτ1 , τ ∈ W ′ to be full-rank
simultaneously. Now using lemma 18 we can see that these
constraints on the matrices Dρs can all be satisfied simultane-
ously –with the local repairability and multicast capacity– for
all τ ∈ W ′ for a large enough alphabet size [10], [6, Lemma
4]. Therefore, a random LNC satisfies the full rank constraints
of lemma 17.
Therefore, for the random LNC obtained above, for any
eavesdropper EDτ observing Eτ ⊆ [n], I(s[k0]\[ℓ]; cEτ ) = 0.
Since the data collectors can recover s from any m nodes
and H(s[k0]\[ℓ]|s) = 0, the secret is recoverable from any m
shares. Therefore, we have an (n, k, ℓ,m, r)-scheme achieving
the upper bound in eq. (7).
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